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Abstract 
This paper argues that Friedrich A. v. Hayek’s theory of mind and the relation between 
mental and physical events, most systematically presented in his 1952 book, The Sensory Order, 
is indebted to Ernst Mach’s theory, and, in particular, to his Analysis of Sensations, above and 
beyond what Hayek himself along with multiple admirers of his work ever cared to admit. By 
highlighting a number of important similarities between Mach’s and Hayek’s theories of the 
psychical/phenomenal and physical world/order, the paper aims to show that key aspects of 
Hayek’s theory of mind can be traced back to Mach’s theoretical foundations. 
 Hayek, Mach, and the Re-ordering of Mind 
This order which we call mind is thus the order prevailing in a particular part of the physical universe – that part of it 
which is ourselves. 
Hayek (1952, 178) 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical and methodological foundations of Friedrich A. von Hayek’s work have been much 
debated. Accounts emphasizing singular theoretical breaks and methodological turning points in 
Hayek’s thought have played a prominent role in those debates (e.g. Caldwell, 1988; Fleetwood, 
1995; Hutchinson, 1981). This paper takes a different approach in that it seeks to emphasize a 
remarkable degree of continuity in Hayek’s intellectual trajectory. I argue that the transformations – 
one or many – that Hayek might have undergone appear superficial against the backdrop of long-
standing traits of his thought that could be traced back to foundational influences he experienced in 
the years following World War One in his native Vienna.  This paper engages with one of those 
influences stemming from Hayek’s exposure to the ideas of Ernst Mach, a physicist turned 
philosopher of science and a famous anti-metaphysical thinker at the time, whose often neglected, 
and even more often misrepresented, influence on Hayek’s theory of mind is difficult to exaggerate.  
This paper argues that Hayek’s theory of mind and the relation between mental and physical 
events, most systematically presented in his 1952 book, The Sensory Order, is indebted to Mach’s 
theory, and, in particular, to his Analysis of Sensations, above and beyond what Hayek himself along 
with multiple admirers of his work ever cared to admit. While many writers have acknowledged, 
typically in passing, that Mach’s ideas at one time influenced Hayek, very few have actually grappled 
with a closer examination of how significant this influence was or why it endured. In fact, the 
majority have contented themselves with Hayek’s self-congratulating version of the affair (i.e. that he 
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had crafted a ‘critique’ of Mach’s theory), without any serious study or assessment of the impact of 
Mach’s ideas on Hayek based on an engagement with the former’s own work. Notably, despite 
Hayek’s claim to have refuted the phenomenalist foundations of Mach’s philosophical conclusions, 
the underpinnings of his theory of mind are taken over directly from Mach while the main thesis of 
The Sensory Order reads like ‘an ambitious extrapolation of Mach’s own thesis concerning the nature 
and status of sensations’ (Smith, 1997, 15).  
The purpose of this paper is not to defend Mach’s psychology or his philosophy but rather 
to demonstrate that Hayek’s venture into ‘theoretical psychology’ – his theory of the sensory order – 
becomes fully comprehensible only by reestablishing its original link to Mach’s theoretical system. 
By pointing to the continuity in Hayek’s work, I do not mean to imply that said continuity signifies a 
lack of contradictions. On the contrary, contradictions abound. And some of those contradictions 
stem directly from Hayek’s attempt to separate the ‘rational kernel’ of Mach’s psychology from the 
allegedly ‘metaphysical’ shell of his philosophy by integrating the former into his approach while 
attempting to discard the latter. Arguably, in-built contradictions of Hayek’s own approach can 
account for the widely differing interpretations of his work offered by various scholars and for the 
need to resort to transitions, transformations, breaks, phases, and periods in an attempt to make 
sense of his meandering through subjectivism, apriorism, empiricism, materialism, less materialism, 
and dualism ‘for practical purposes’, to name but a few. For Hayek is a pragmatist and even an 
opportunist depending on what he wants to argue. Thus, on his own admission, he is a materialist in 
asserting that mental qualities could be explained by the operation of the same kind of processes as 
those occurring in the material world (Hayek, 1952, 177). But at the same time, he is less 
materialistic than the dualists that defend the existence of mind as a separate substance. However, he 
could also content himself with a dualistic view of the world ‘for practical purposes’, that is, when he 
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wants to object to the behaviorism of John B. Watson, the physicalism of Otto Neurath, and other 
varieties of materialism (Ibid, 179). 
The remainder of this paper proceeds to outline some essential features of Mach’s and 
Hayek’s theories of the psychical/phenomenal and physical world/order. By highlighting a number 
of similarities between them I attempt to show that key aspects of Hayek’s theory of mind can be 
traced back to Mach’s theoretical foundations. The paper concludes with an examination of the 
validity of the criticisms Hayek levels against Mach.  
 
From Elements to Compounds to a Unified System: The World as a Continuum 
Mach’s theoretical perspective has conventionally been placed within the philosophical tradition of 
neutral monism whose central idea is generally construed as that physics and psychology, or the 
study of physical and mental events, are different ways of constructing theories about what is 
originally given as ‘neutral’ matter. In Mach’s version of neutral monism, what is originally given is 
not ‘matter’ but homogenous elements which represent the ultimate constituents of all physical and 
mental phenomena. These elements form compounds or complexes whose patterns of combination 
are constantly changing. The difference between mental and physical phenomena arises from the 
different ways in which the elements are combined or arranged. Thus, both mind (the ego) and 
matter (the body) are complexes or combinations of elements. ‘Thing, body, matter, are nothing 
apart from the combinations of the elements, the colors, sounds, and so forth’ (Mach, 1914, 6) 1. 
Similarly, the ego is ‘that complex of memories, moods, and feelings, joined to a particular body (the 
human body)’ (Ibid, 3). Once we have discovered that 
the supposed unities ‘body’ and ‘ego’ are only makeshifts, designed for provisional orientation and for definite 
practical ends…, [t]he antithesis between ego and world, between sensation (appearance) and thing, then 
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vanishes, and we have simply to deal with the connexion of the elements…, of which this antithesis was only a 
partially appropriate and imperfect expression. This connexion is nothing more or less than the combination of 
the above-mentioned elements with other similar elements (time and space). (Ibid, 13) 
 
The terms ‘elements’, understood as the ultimate constituents of all things, and ‘sensations’ are not 
identical (some confusion here arises from the fact that Mach frequently refers to ‘sensations’ as 
‘elements of experience’, for example). This does not mean that sensations are intrinsically different 
from the elements but rather that elements become sensations only when ‘standing to one another 
in a certain known relation’ (connexion) of functional dependence on each other (Ibid, 243). ‘In 
another functional relation [the elements] are at the same time physical objects’ (Ibid, 16). Thus, 
Mach’s elements are neither physical nor psychical. It is their ordering in any concrete 
situation/configuration (‘the nature of the connexion’) that allows them to be classified as the one or 
the other. Mach, long before Hayek, suggested that human mind uses the sensory order in order to 
classify objects. The need to ‘arrange’ facts and phenomena thereby forming a mental system of 
classification arises from the limitations of the human cognitive capacity and memory, in particular 
(Mach, 1911, 55). Science emerges as a result of the inability of human mind to retain all individual 
facts. This is why we need classification, systematization, various shorthand formulae for collections 
of empirical facts, such as scientific laws, and theories as systems of ordered facts. 
 In Mach’s view, all science should be based on evidence which is gathered through 
sensations. While experience represents Mach's epistemic base, his notion of it is rather specific and, 
as we shall see, closely aligned with the one adopted by Hayek. Experience has an immediate 
(sensory) component and an a priori component which, in contradistinction to Kantian philosophy, 
is not of transcendental nature but is itself formed in experience and manifested in ‘memory-traces 
of former experience and their interconnection (association)’ present not only in higher-level 
organisms but also in elementary ones (Mach, 1914, 100). Individual memory which plays an 
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essential role in classifying and retaining personal experience has a hereditary component reflective 
of the ‘experience of the race’. Thus, sensations, the starting point of all perceptions that form 
human experience, arise through the interaction between immediate sensory impulses and pre-
existing cognitive structures. It is because of these structures that we are able to classify the relations 
between the elements constituting sensations as in the example of a melody that cannot be 
recognized by capturing its single sounds but only by capturing the relations between them (Becchio, 
2011, 174). 
The fact that all fields of scientific inquiry have the same source of evidence – sensations – 
serves as a key rational for the unification of sciences that Mach thought would eventually occur. 
But it is not just the source of evidence that is common to all sciences, they also share the same 
purpose – the adaptation of thoughts to facts and of the thoughts to each other – along with the 
same method. In contradistinction to traditional anti-metaphysicians who challenged the conclusions 
of metaphysics based on its speculative method and favored the observational method instead, 
Mach takes a different path. Scientific conclusions may be tentative but it is the method of attaining 
knowledge, not the knowledge itself, whose validity must be ensured. The soundness of the 
scientific method must be certified by its ability to successfully relate concepts and ideas to their 
empirical base. In Mach’s view, the method of science is neither subjective, as in metaphysics, nor 
objective as in traditional empiricism, but impersonal (Cohen, 1968). ‘The ego, Mach (1914, 24) 
famously wrote, must be given up’. It is important to elucidate the exact meaning of that.  
Mach sees the world as a continuum of connexions of elements in constant flux. The ego is 
also a continuum or ‘continuity’ as Mach sometimes prefers to call it. More precisely, the ego is a 
temporary continuum in the larger, more permanent continuum of the world. It is not the ego per se 
but ‘continuity alone’ that is important. Continuity, however, is only ‘a means’ of maintaining and 
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preserving the contents of the ego which are not ultimately confined to the individual but can 
endure even after their death.  
Contents of consciousness […] that are of universal significance, break through [the] limits of the individual, 
and, attached of course to individuals again, can enjoy a continued existence of an impersonal, superpersonal 
kind, independently of the personality by means of which they were developed. To contribute to this is the greatest 
happiness of the artist, the scientist, the inventor, the social reformer, etc. (Ibid, 24) 
 
The purpose of this analysis is not to provide a justification or even assess the plausibility of Mach’s 
idea of unified science but simply to suggest that said idea could be seen as logically following from 
Mach’s conception of the universe as a continuum.  
 
How the Limited Ability of Human Mind to Comprehend the Unitary Order, of Which It 
Forms Part, Produces the Appearance of Two Orders 
The Sensory Order developed out of a manuscript entitled ‘Contributions to the Theory of the 
Development of Consciousness’ that Hayek wrote in the summer of 1920 while still a student at the 
University of Vienna. Hayek’s renewed attention to this problematique, some 25 years after he had 
first encountered and abandoned it, can be fully understood only within the context of his endeavor 
to prove that there is ‘no other way’ to study social phenomena than through understanding of 
individual action and behavior (Hayek, 1948, 3). The stated purpose of the 1920 paper was to 
develop a physiological explanation of ‘consciousness phenomena’ (Bewusstseinserscheinungen) 
thereby integrating the study of consciousness ‘into the world view of natural science’ (Hayek, 
2006[1920]), 199). The purpose of The Sensory Order, although more ambitious in scope and 
somewhat more sophisticatedly phrased is practically unchanged: it aims to develop a physiologically 
based theory of mind and consciousness. The 1920 paper represented a reaction to and an 
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attempted critique of some aspects of Mach’s theoretical system. In the 1952 book, Hayek mentions 
approvingly Mach’s psychology but denounces his philosophy on the grounds of its phenomenalist 
tendencies. And yet both the topic of the book and its chosen title evoke a direct reference to 
Mach’s Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical.  
As Hayek states early in the book, The Sensory Order represents his take on the traditional 
mind-body problem, or the relation between mental and physical events. He takes on the somewhat 
tricky task of showing how the two orders – the objective, physical one which is the subject of 
physical sciences and the subjective, mental or phenomenal one which we experience as individuals 
– are similar but not identical. The task is tricky because Hayek, similarly to Mach, sees the mental 
order as a part of the physical order (although, a part ‘whose precise position in that larger order we 
shall never be able to determine’ (Hayek, 1952, 5)) and intends to show that there is a systematic 
structural similarity between the two. The trickiness of the entire enterprise is compounded by the 
fact that it is laid down not on an original Hayekian ‘individualist’ and anti-collectivist foundation 
but on the borrowed wholistic and anti-ego, Machian one. The resort to this shortcut has augmented 
the number and magnitude of Hayekian contradictions, some of which will be discussed below.  
 Hayek’s ontological categorization of all things existing in the world (he systematically 
prefers to call these things ‘events’ whereas Mach’s terms of choice are sensations, (sensory) 
elements, or phenomena) is analogous to the one developed by Mach. The latter identifies three 
different categories or subsets of element compounds: the objects of the physical world designated 
by the letters A, B, C…, which exhibit strong event regularities and are the subject of physics. The 
second category designated by K, L, M... represents ‘the complex, known as our own body, which is 
a part of the former complexes distinguished by certain peculiarities’. The final category designated 
by α, β, γ… includes memory images, perceptions, abstract concepts, etc., that is, the totality of 
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mental life. The combination of the last two categories constitutes ‘the ego’ and is the subject of 
psychology. Mach argues that these three subsets are not only connected but codetermine one other 
(Mach 1914, 8ff.). Hayek similarly identifies three different structures each consisting of multiple 
distinct elements that relate to each other thereby forming an order: the physical order of the 
external world, or of the physical stimuli; the neural order of the fibres, and of the impulses 
proceeding in these fibres, and the mental or phenomenal order of sensations and other mental 
qualities (Hayek, 1952, 39ff.). 
Hayek defines the sensory or phenomenal order as a subset of the larger mental order. The 
peculiar attributes of the latter, such as images, emotions, and abstract concepts, are organized 
according to the same general principles that govern the order of sensory qualities. The mental order 
itself is a part of the physical order being located in a sub-system of the latter (the organism). This 
sub-system is in some respects similar to and in others different from the more comprehensive 
physical order. Hayek emphasizes that the difference between the phenomenal and physical order is 
not tantamount to the difference between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’ but arises from the difference 
between the effects that the physical objects have on each other and the effects of they have on us.  
In so far as the similarities or differences of the phenomena as perceived by us do not correspond with the 
similarities or differences which the perceived events manifest in their relations to each other, we are not entitled 
to assume that the world appears to us as it does because it is like that; the question why it appears to us as it 
does becomes a genuine problem. (Ibid, 6) 
This genuine problem indeed is due to be solved by the science of psychology which should ‘take 
the physical world as represented by modern physics as given and try to reconstruct the process by 
which the organism classifies the physical events in the manner which is familiar to us as the order 
of sensory qualities’ (Ibid, 7). Hayek then proceeds to reconstruct mental activity as physical activity 
by equating the mental or phenomenal order with the neural order existing between the fibers in the 
central nervous system and the impulses transmitted by them in response to external stimuli. On his 
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reading, the neural order and the mental or phenomenal order are not only isomorphous but 
identical to the point that postulating ‘a separate set of terms for the mental order would be 
redundant’ (Ibid, 39-40).  
Hayek’s intent to disprove Mach’s view of parallelism between mental and physical events 
along with the related behaviorist contention of direct correspondence between stimulus and 
response (which he thought Mach was also guilty of) hinges on the attempt to show that the two 
orders are similar but not identical. On the one hand, Hayek argues that the mental and the physical 
world are ‘two different orders in which the same elements can be arranged’ (Ibid, 4). The 
arrangement of these elements is such that the phenomenal, respectively, mental order reproduces 
the order existing in the physical world. This reproduction is achieved through ‘“classification” (as 
we shall call it) of the stimuli by the organism [which] can be said to “reproduce” the “objective” 
relations between those stimuli in the physical world’ (Ibid, 42). The mental order thus models the 
physical order. Notably, the central agent of classification – mind – represents simultaneously the 
process of classification resulting in the establishment of the mental order and that order itself. The 
mind is thus itself an instance of spontaneous order analogous to that existing in the physical world.  
On the other hand, Hayek asserts that there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
stimulus and response, respectively, between the physical and phenomenal order, as demonstrated, 
for example, by the fact that elements of a similar kind in the physical world may appear different to 
our senses. This is why sensory perceptions of events differ from their scientific presentation. This 
problem has occupied Hayek since his 1920 paper, where he first attempted to figure out how a 
physiological stimulus is converted into a conscious sense experience. The last observable point in 
the process that takes place between the external stimulus and the emergence of sensation is the 
arousal of ganglion cells in the brain. Beyond that point, there is a gap until the final appearance of 
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the original stimulus as conscious sense experience. It is the reconstruction of what is happening 
during that gap that Hayek attempted to accomplish. At that time, he was already critical of the 
perspective of ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ which, according to his presentation, saw the conversion 
of the impulses into sensations by the brain as a simple inexplicable process and thus as a basic fact 
which did not merit further examination. As a representative example of that perspective, Hayek 
quotes from W. Jerusalem’s Lehrbuch der Psychologie (although, by Hayek’s own admission, Jerusalem 
was not a ‘parallelist in the strict sense of the word’): ‘When the impulse reaches the cortex, it is 
inexplicably converted into a mental state, from a simple stimulus into a sensation’ and ‘The simple 
or pure sensation is therefore an elementary mental process which we analyze’ (Hayek, 2006[1920]), 
200, fn. 1). Hayek then proceeds on the assumption that these statements represent the gist of the 
phenomenological perspective with Mach as a key representative to mount a critique against him on 
that basis.  
The lack of direct correspondence between stimulus and response is also a central problem 
in The Sensory Order. This time Hayek targets not only phenomenalism but also various behaviorist 
perspectives that were influential at the time along with Neurath’s physicalism (Caldwell, 2004). 
Based on the assertion of direct correspondence between stimulus and response, behaviorists either 
deny or disregard the existence of two separate orders. Mach’s views on that subject are somewhat 
more subtle. He indeed states that there is ‘complete parallelism of the psychical and the physical...[and thus] 
no gulf between the two provinces’ (Ibid, 60). Mach also assumes that there is some correspondence 
between physiological factors and resultant sensory qualities even though the connection is different 
from the one elicit by Hayek. Mach’s parallelism, should not be taken to imply that there is a 
complete identity between mental (psychical) and physical phenomena, neither should they be 
construed as different aspects of the same reality. As Mach explains, if the principle of parallelism is 
understood to mean that 
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a definite element or constituent of a physiological event must correspond to everything which we can 
distinguish as having some sort of psychological unity, to every relation, to every form, in a word to everything 
that we can denote by a general conception, then this formulation can only be characterized as dubious and 
misleading. (Ibid, 70) 
Rather, and particularly in more complicated cases, the similarity between the psychical and the 
physical ‘arises not from the presence of one common element, but from a common system of 
elements’ (Ibid). In this context, Mach also admits to some problems with the concept of 
parallelism. Chief among those is the impossibility to identify the physical counterparts to memory 
and association: ‘In this respect it seems as if there were almost no analogy between the organic and 
the inorganic’ (Ibid, 101). And yet, he attributes this problem to the insufficient development of 
physics and psychology. Thus, while believing that ‘a comprehension of memory on physical lines’ 
may not be unattainable in principle, Mach acknowledges that at the present level of scientific 
development ‘we are still very far removed from it’ (Ibid, 238). In his view, what is needed is not 
dualistic explanations but ‘a science which, [by] embracing both the organic and the inorganic, shall 
[be able to] interpret the facts that are common to the two departments’ (Ibid, 101). It is important 
to emphasize that Mach’s conception of sensations emerging as a result of the interaction of 
immediate sensory experience and pre-existing cognitive structures embedded in physiological 
memory poses an immediate and serious challenge to the claim of his alleged espousal of the notion 
of identity between the physical and phenomenal world mediated by the direct correspondence 
between stimulus and response. 
In contradistinction to behaviorism, Neurath’s physicalism, and his interpretation of Mach’s 
phenomenalism, Hayek argues that the organism can respond in different ways to the same stimulus 
or in the same way to different stimuli depending on their particular combinations. In some cases, 
several different stimuli may be required to produce a particular sensation. The reason for the lack of 
one-to-one correspondence between stimulus and response lies in the fact that the nervous system is 
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an imperfect instrument of classification. More specifically, the production of impulses in response 
to external events (stimuli) is mediated by receptor organs which perform a sort of initial 
classification of stimuli. These receptor organs are imperfectly selective. They do not respond to all 
kinds of stimuli but only to ‘adequate stimuli’. Sometimes, however, events other than ‘adequate 
stimuli’ can trigger impulses in given nervous fibres. 
Further to the denial of direct correspondence between stimulus and response, Hayek rejects 
the so-called theory of the specific nervous energy of impulses, supported by Johannes Mueller, 
according to which differences in the attributes of individual impulses are responsible for difference 
in the sensory qualities (that is, sensations produced by impulses in different fibres would be 
different, similar or equal depending of the properties of the corresponding impulses). On Hayek’s 
presentation, the specific effect of a particular impulse is not determined by the attributes of the 
stimulus which caused it or by the attributes of the impulse but by the position of the fibre which 
carries the impulse in the structure of the nervous system. There is no qualitative difference between 
impulses, and, therefore, no correspondence between the attributes of impulses and the attributes of 
sensory qualities. In that respect, Hayek’s impulses seem much like Mach’s homogenous elements. It 
is the order of the nervous fibres carrying the impulses that determines the sensory qualities (that is, 
the neural order determines the sensory order).  
A key point that Hayek makes is that the nervous system does not respond to any particular 
stimulus but to undifferentiated masses of stimuli which are classified into groups in subsequent 
steps. Importantly, external events acting as stimuli are classified on the basis of the effects they 
have on other external events and not according to their effects on our senses. This is the 
classification developed by the physical sciences that Hayek adopted for at least two reasons. First, 
to argue that the physical world exists independently of our sense perceptions and second, to argue 
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that in the process of human interaction with the world the nervous system/mind classifies sensory 
data in a way that model the order existing in the physical world without, however, being able to 
achieve perfect correspondence. The process of classification results in two different kinds of 
physiological memory as traces left behind in response to external events: the map and the model. 
The map is a semi-permanent record of the structure of connexions or paths through which chains 
of impulses can run representing ‘the kind of world in which the organism has existed in the past’ 
and thus a record of the relationships between different kinds of stimuli the organism has reacted to. 
The model represents the pattern of impulses within a given network of semi-permanent channels at 
any given moment thus reproducing the particular environment in which the organism is placed at 
that particular moment (Hayek, 1952, 112-5). 
As the above analysis suggests, the correspondence between stimulus and response, 
respectively, between physical and mental events, is imperfect because, according to Hayek, the 
nervous system along with its superstructure, the mind, constitutes an imperfect instrument/process 
of classification. Despite the fact that the classification process and results are bound to undergo 
frequent adjustment in a trial-and-error process where the organism chooses the paths of least 
resistance based on the reevaluation of past experience, the ‘order that we call mind’ remains only ‘a 
partial reproduction of the environmental order’. Does this mean that the mental and physical 
orders are objectively different? Not at all. The two orders appear different to us because of the 
‘limitations of the powers of our own mind fully to comprehend the unitary order to which they 
belong’ (Ibid, 191). 
In sum, Hayek’s attempted refutation of the parallelism between the physical and 
phenomenal world is not ultimately based on any assertion of objective differences between the two 
orders but on the inability of the human brain to figure out and explain its own working which is a 
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necessary precondition for establishing a strict identification between mental and physical events. 
Arguably, this constitutes less of a refutation of the psycho-physical parallelism than a confirmation 
of the lowly status of human beings as animal organisms forced to constantly readjust their mental 
patterns and behavior in the struggle for survival but ultimately unable to even comprehend the 
larger order of things. 
 
Man is a Natural Being in the Continuum of Events Where All Things are Defined 
Relationally 
The above analysis has touched upon a number of similarities between Mach’s and Hayek’s 
respective theories which will be developed in a more systematic form below. It is important to keep 
in mind that this is not an exhaustive account of what Mach and Hayek have in common. 
 
Knowledge is of Organic Nature and Always Due to Experience 
Hayek and Mach share a naturalist view of man as an animal that differs in degree but not in kind 
from other biological organisms. ‘The mental differences between man and animal are not 
qualitative but only quantitative’ (Mach, 1976[1905], 53). ‘Man forms his concepts in the same way 
as animals’, although with support by language and social intercourse (Ibid, 93). References to 
animal societies appear throughout Hayek’s oeuvre not only in relation to human behavior and 
mental patterns but also as justification for key institutions of capitalist society, such as private 
property (e.g. Hayek, 1982, 75). Hayek and Mach see the process of acquisition of knowledge and its 
scientific development as part of the human struggle for survival through adaptation to the natural 
and social environment. Hayek is by far the more conservative of them both. Unlike Mach 
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(1976[1905], 359), who in the spirit of social reformism appeals for mobilizing energy to realize ‘the 
ideal of a moral world order’ with the help of psychological and sociological insights gained through 
the advancement of modern science, Hayek is not only skeptical of but outright hostile to any 
putative attempt on the part of the human animal to creatively transform his/her environment with 
the help of reason – that ‘dangerous explosive’ which may blow up a civilization if not handled 
cautiously (Hayek, 1967, 93). For him, adaptation and not transformation is the name of the game. 
Thus, Hayek’s human animal is at once ‘conservative’ in that it relies heavily on previously 
accumulated experience and ‘futuristic’ in that it struggles to adapt to a changing environment 
through the accumulation of new knowledge and the assimilation into new behavioral patterns 
(Forsyth, 1988, 243). 
The biological view of man finds a natural counterpart in a biologically oriented 
epistemology where knowledge is seen as having ‘an organic nature’. The origins of an evolutionary 
perspective of knowledge precede Darwin’s theory and could be traced back at least to Herbert 
Spencer’s The Principles of Psychology, first published in 1855, where Spencer proposes to expand the 
doctrine that all knowledge (‘intelligence’) is acquired through experience to include not only the 
experience of each individual, but also ‘the experiences of all ancestral individuals’ because what is ‘a 
priori for the individual [is] a posteriori for that entire series of individuals of which he forms the last 
term’ (1920, Vol. II, 195). In close alignment with this view, Hayek and Mach share a biologically 
oriented epistemology where knowledge is created through the interaction of individual sensory 
experience and pre-sensory cognitive structures formed as a result of the combination of past 
individual experience and the ‘experience of the race’. Mach sees phylogenesis repeated in 
ontogenesis ‘in an abbreviated form’. Key epistemological concepts, such as cause and effect, have 
developed ‘instinctively and involuntarily’ in the course of human evolution. ‘We may, indeed, say 
that our sense of causality is not acquired by the individual, but has been perfected in the 
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development of the race’ (Mach, 1919, 485). Hayek (1952, 60) also emphasizes that the process of 
the formation of the order of sensory qualities had phylogenetic and ontogenetic aspects as ‘some of 
the connexions formed in the development of the species become embedded in the structure of the 
central nervous system while others will be formed during the life of the individual’. Thus, while all 
knowledge is due to experience, the latter is not limited to sensory experience: knowledge has an a 
priori, pre-sensory but still empirical component.  
There is no experience and thus no learning without memory. Memory and heredity are 
linked: ‘Heredity, instinct and the like may then be described as memory reaching beyond the 
individual’ (Mach, 1976[1905], 35). Both ancestral experience and past individual experience leave 
traces in the brain: ‘One might almost say that each individual thinks with his past’ (Hayek, quoted 
in Caldwell, 2004, 241). Memory is thus the a priori mechanism that enables the emergence of all 
mental phenomena through the translation of physiological impulses into unified sense experiences. 
While Hayek’s presentation of these processes is better known today, the foundational insights 
originated in Mach as evident, for example, by the following extended quotation: 
It is well known that a very prominent position is given, in psychology, to the laws of association… The 
differences of mental process, in simple memory of an experience, in serious occupation, and in the free exercise of 
fancy or day-dreaming, can easily be understood by means of the concomitant circumstances. It would, however, 
be a complete mistake to try to reduce all […] psychical processes to associations acquired during the life of the 
individual. In none of its phases do we meet with the psyche as a tabula rasa. At the very least we should have 
to assume innate associations side by side with the acquired. The innate impulses, which, to a psychology that is 
purely introspective and confined to itself, must necessarily appear to be innate associations, are reduced by 
biology to innate organic connexions, and, in particular, to nervous connexions. It is therefore worth while to 
inquire whether all associations, including those acquired by the individual, do not depend upon innate 
connexions, of which some have been strengthened by use. But in any case we must also ask whether the 
processes for the connexion of which in highly differentiated organisms special paths have been evolved, are not 
rather primary facts that already exist in lower organisms, and whether it is not their repeated occurrence 
accompanied by one another that has led to the formation of the paths in question. (Mach, 1914, 239-241) 
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Both in his 1920 paper and in the 1952 book, Hayek seeks to provide an explanation of how 
external stimuli cause physiological responses by the brain which, in turn, result in the emergence of 
sensory experience which may not be directly identical with the external event that triggered it. 
Hayek’s analysis of these processes is not only consistent with Mach’s theory but could be seen as 
building upon it. Stimuli cause physiological impulses that are converted into sensations in the 
process of interaction between new sensory data and pre-existing cognitive structures embedded in 
physiological memory. New experience is classified by the mind based on its relation to previous 
experience. As Hayek (1952, xix) notes: ‘[e]very sensation, even the ‘purest’, must … be regarded as 
an interpretation of an event in the light of the past experience of the individual or the species’. By 
substituting ‘judgment’ for ‘interpretation’, Mach describes a similar process:  
The process of judgment… consists in the enrichment, extension, and supplementation of sensational 
presentations by other sensational presentations under the guidance of sense-given facts. If the process is over, and 
the image has assumed a familiar shape, making its appearance in consciousness as a completed presentation, 
then we have no longer to do with a judgment but merely with a simple memory… Intuitive knowledge of the 
sort just described impresses itself upon the memory, and makes its appearance in the form of recollections which 
spontaneously supplement every fact presented by the senses. (Mach, 1914, 317-9) 
 
In sum, some of the essential insights of Hayek’s psychology and epistemology, such as the notion 
of experience as a combination of individual and ancestral experience along with the role of memory 
in the formation of new experience can be traced back to Mach’s theoretical foundations. Overall, 
Hayek’s epistemology follows in the footsteps of Mach’s empiricist, biologically oriented theory of 
knowledge. Hayek himself describes his stance as ‘empiricist’ stressing that his opposition to some 
views traditionally associated with empiricism stems not from the rejection of the latter from ‘an 
opposite point of view’ but from ‘a more consistent and radical application of [empiricism’s] basic 
idea’: 
Precisely because all our knowledge, including the initial order of our different sensory experiences of the world, is 
due to experience, it must contain elements which cannot be contradicted by experience… Sensory experience 
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presupposes, therefore, an order of experienced objects which precedes that experience and which cannot be 
contradicted by it, though it is itself due to other, earlier experience. (Hayek, 1952, 172) 
 
Monism: The Universe as a Continuum of Events 
Hayek’s empiricist epistemology builds upon a materialist ontology. For he, similarly to Mach, is a 
monist. This statement may appear disconcerting to those who would rather approach Hayek by way 
of established authoritative views on the subject. Numerous writers have repeatedly cited one 
another to certify Hayek as a ‘subjective idealist’ whose thought builds upon a Kantian foundation. 
Claims, such as Gray’s (1982) that ‘Hayek's theory of knowledge is Kantian… in affirming that the 
order we find in the world is given to it by the organizing structure of our own mind’ are remarkable 
in how unsubstantiated and counterfactual they are in relation to Hayek’s own exposition in The 
Sensory Order. Mind does not give the world its ‘organizing structure’; rather, it learns to model the 
‘organizing structure’ already existing in said world. And even the word ‘structure’ is not quite 
compatible with Hayek’s meaning. The mind is not a structure or at best it is a sequence of 
structures in constant flux, that is, a process and so is the order in the physical world. The 
qualification of Hayek as a ‘subjective idealist’ is further questionable in light of his view of man as a 
natural being and his biological and empiricist theory of knowledge. Portraying Hayek’s ‘organism’ 
as the transcendental subject who employs the synthesizing process and the categories of the pure 
reason to filter sense experience thereby rendering the world from a thing-in-itself into a thing-for-
us (e.g. Fleetwood, 1995) sounds somewhat peculiar in light of Hayek’s exposition of abstract 
conceptual thinking as a higher-level stage of an essentially physiological process common to all 
biological beings, such as turtles, goats, and humans, among others. 
The notion of a Kantian heritage cannot but seem incomprehensible to the discerning reader 
of The Sensory Order where Hayek proposes a causal or physiological theory of mind and 
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consciousness based on the premise that mental states are the product of causal relations (Feser, 
2011). Hayek’s theory is physicalist in that he perceived mental activity as essentially reducible to and 
explicable by physiological activity: ‘in some ultimate sense mental phenomena are “nothing but” 
physical processes’ (Hayek, 1952, 191). Hayek’s theory is also materialist in that his account of the 
determination of mental qualities explained them ‘by the operation of processes of the same kind as 
those which we observe in the material world’ (Ibid, 177). Hayek’s mind is not a substance but an 
‘order of events, different from the order of events which we encounter in the physical world, but 
determined by the same kind of forces as those that rule in that world’ (Ibid, 178). This means that 
the mind and its working are characterized by the same type of regularities that one encounters in 
the physical world. Ultimately, there is no ‘objective difference’ between mental and physical events. 
Any appearance of a difference is solely attributable to the limitations of the human brain to ‘fully 
comprehend the unitary order’ of the universe.  
Further, Hayek is a monist because he, similarly to Mach, sees the universe as ‘a continuum 
of physical events, which is in principle explicable by one and the same scientific method’ (Forsyth, 
1988, 240). As Hayek (1942, 51-2) notes: 
The distinction between the search for generic principles and the explanation of concrete phenomena has thus no 
necessary connection with the distinction between the study of nature and the study of society.  In both fields we 
need generalisations in order to explain concrete and unique events.  Whenever we attempt to explain or 
understand a particular phenomenon we can do so only by recognising it or its parts as members of certain 
classes of phenomena, and the explanation of the particular phenomenon presupposes the existence of general 
rules. 
As mental activities are ultimately ‘nothing but’ physical processes, evidently the same 
methodological principles should apply to the study of the former. Unsurprisingly, Hayek, similarly 
to Mach, sees the ego or ‘I’ as a continuum of events; more precisely as the ‘universal relatedness of 
all events’ to a common reference point when consciousness ‘is awake’ (Hayek, 1952, 138). Hayek 
and Mach are in agreement that the difference between lower-order and higher-order mental 
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processes is not qualitative but quantitative, that is, is determined by their varying degrees of 
complexity. Consciousness is no exception. According to Mach (1976[1905], 17), there is ‘a 
continuous transition’ from the concrete ideas of ordinary thought to the most abstract scientific 
ones. Concepts develop from ‘the simplest rudiments’ to the highest level of scientific inquiry with 
‘each higher level using the lower ones as a foundation’ (Ibid, 97). Hayek similarly asserts that there 
is ‘no substantial difference’ between sensation and perception as essentially similar acts of 
classification performed by the central nervous system.  All mental phenomena from sense 
perceptions and images to concepts and ideas are acts of classification performed by the brain. They 
constitute different stages in a range of processes where ‘the “higher” mental activities are merely a 
repetition at successive levels of processes of classification of essentially the same character as those 
by which the different sensory qualities have come to be distinguished in the first instance’ (Hayek, 
1952, 77-8; 174-5). 
In conclusion, while Hayek is clearly not an ‘idealist’, subjectivism and individualism are 
undeniable features of his philosophy. How do they tie in with his materialism? Is ‘subjective 
materialism’ always an oxymoron? ‘Materialism, Schopenhauer (1909, 167) posits, is the philosophy 
of the subject that forgets to take account of itself’. The application of this aphoristic 
pronouncement to Hayek’s case makes for some interesting revelations. Hayek is a defender of 
subjectivism but his individualism, similarly to his liberalism, is of bizarre sort. His causal theory of 
mind is incapable of explaining consciousness, intentionality, inference, or the descriptive and 
argumentative functions of language (Feser, 2011; Forsyth, 1988; Popper, 1953; Smith, 1997). It is 
ultimately incapable of explaining what constitutes true individuality and what makes an individual 
unique for reasons other than biology and experience. Thus, much in line with Mach’s appeal, the 
ego of Hayek’s individual has been given up.  
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All Things and Events are Defined Relationally 
Both Hayek and Mach postulate that it is not the simple constituent elements of things or events 
that matter but the connexions between those elements and their constantly changing combinations. 
One cannot help but wonder as to whether writers who fail to acknowledge this similarity, or argue 
that this relational view of things constitutes a novel and superior feature of Hayek’s theory in 
contradistinction to Mach, have actually paid any serious attention to the latter’s work. Birner (1996), 
for example, posits that ‘one of the great differences’ between Hayek’s and Mach’s psychology 
constitutes in the former’s discovery  
that the sensory (or other mental) qualities are not in some manner originally attached to, or an original 
attribute of, the individual physiological impulses, but that the whole of these qualities is determined by the 
system of connexions by which the impulses can be transmitted from neuron to neuron; that it is thus the 
position of the individual impulse or group of impulses in the whole system of such connexions which gives it its 
distinctive quality; that this system of connexions is acquired in the course of the development of the species and 
the individual by a kind of ‘experience’ or ‘learning’; and that it reproduces therefore at every stage of its 
development certain relationships existing in the physical environment between the stimuli evoking the impulses. 
(Hayek, 1952, 53) 
In actuality, the idea that the mental and physical order can be defined in terms of the relations 
between their elements, which plays such a prominent role in Hayek’s theoretical system, builds 
upon an unmistakably Machian foundation. 
One of Mach’s central theses is that the elements or sensations should not be considered as 
isolated phenomena but in their functional dependence on each other. As mentioned above, the 
elements become sensations only when they stand in a specific relation (connexion) to each other. 
Hence, ‘[e]very scientific problem that can have any meaning for a human individual is concerned 
with the ascertainment of the dependence of the elements on one another’ (Mach, 1914, 243). 
Mach’s relational view of the elements leads him to question the usefulness of the traditional notion 
of causality for the study of natural phenomena. In his view, the ‘connexions of nature’ are far too 
complex in order to be adequately captured or explained by the simple cause-and-effect determinism 
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employed by physics. Therefore, he proposes the replacement of the traditional understanding of 
causality by a conception similar to the mathematical conception of function that would emphasize 
not only the dependence of phenomena on one another but also, and more accurately, the 
dependence of the characteristics of phenomena on one another (Mach, 1914, 89). ‘An inquirer, 
states Mach (1919, 579) must regard the phenomena as dependent on one another in the same way that 
the geometer regards the sides and angles of a triangle as dependent on one another.’ This mutual 
dependence could be better understood with the following reformulation of the traditional law of 
causality:  
Let us call the totality of the phenomena on which a phenomenon a can be considered as dependent, the cause. If 
this totality is given, a is determined, and determined uniquely. Thus the law of causality may also be expressed 
in the form: “The effect is determined by the cause”. (Mach, 1911, 63-64) 
 
Hayek’s assertions that an event has a meaning only within given order and only in relation to other 
events within the same order and that all questions about the nature of sensory qualities can be 
reduced to the question of what determines the pattern of their ordering build directly on Mach’s 
foundational insights. Let us further recall that Mach specifically states that the parallelism between 
the mental and physical is based not on the presence of ‘one common element’ but on ‘a common 
system of elements’. There is a striking similarity between this view and Hayek’s notion of the relation 
between the mental and physical order where the former is a structural reflection, albeit imperfect, 
of the latter. According to Hayek, the solution of the whole mind-body problem boils down to 
showing that ‘there can exist a system of relations between … physiological events which is identical 
with the system of relations existing between the corresponding mental events’ (Hayek, 1952, 2, 
emphasis added). 
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Hayek’s Criticisms of Mach Refuted 
This section takes a closer look at some of Hayek’s criticisms of Mach and phenomenalism 
presented in The Sensory Order which are based on three main points. First, that Mach’s theory is 
centered on the ‘meaningless’ concept of ‘elementary and constant’ also known as ‘pure and simple’ 
sensations as ultimate constituents of the world; second, that Mach rejects the notion of an 
objectively existing physical world which is different from our sense experience, and third, that 
Mach and phenomenalists in general construe the task of science as merely describing the 
phenomenal world. I shall examine these claims in turn. The purpose of my analysis is not to assess 
whether Mach’s views are right or wrong in absolute terms but rather to demonstrate that Hayek’s 
criticisms are largely based on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of those views. It is further 
asserted that Mach’s theory is more sophisticated than Hayek and others allow it to be. 
Mach is mentioned two times in The Sensory Order. Once in the Preface, where Hayek speaks 
of his initial encounter with his ideas and the subsequent sudden realization ‘how a consistent 
development of Mach’s analysis of perceptual organization made his own concept of sensory 
elements superfluous and otiose, an idle construction in conflict with most of his acute 
psychological analysis’ (1952, vi). There is a second reference towards the end of the book where 
Hayek again asserts his empowerment from Mach’s theory and the refutation of his philosophy as 
follows:  
although the theory developed here was suggested in the first instance by the psychological views which Ernst 
Mach has outlined in his Analysis of Sensations and elsewhere, its systematic development leads to a 
refutation of his and similar phenomenalist philosophies: by destroying the conception of elementary and 
constant sensations as ultimate constituents of the world, it restores the necessity of a belief in an objective 
physical world which is different from that presented to us by our senses. 
Hayek’s preoccupation with the ‘pure and simple’ or ‘constant and elementary’ sensations is 
somewhat peculiar. Neither phrase appears in The Analysis of Sensations or, to my knowledge, in any 
24 
 
other of Mach’s books. The most likely source of the notion of ‘pure and simple’ sensations seems 
to have been Jerusalem’s psychology textbook cited in Hayek’s 1920 paper. As the preceding analysis 
makes clear, a key insight of Mach’s theory is that elements or sensations cannot be analyzed as 
isolated phenomena, categorically and independently of each other, but only in their relation of 
functional interdependence. Sensations ‘always occur in a complex… nothing exist in isolation’ and 
this fact can be only provisionally disregarded for the purpose of scientific inquiry:  
Just as the physicist must be free to analyze the material world for the purpose of scientific investigation, and to 
dismantle it into parts without therefore forgetting the general connected nature of the world, so the psychologist 
too must be equally free, if he is to obtain any result. (Mach, 1976[1905], 359) 
 
Hayek is well aware of Mach’s relational treatment of the elements as evidenced by his remarks on 
the circumstances that inspired the writing of the 1920 paper presented in the early 1980s, where he 
evokes his sudden revelation that the concept of ‘simple and pure sensations’ in Mach’s psychology 
was ‘meaningless’:  
Since Mach had qualified so many of the connections between sensations as ‘relations’, I was finally forced to 
conclude that the whole structure of the sensory world is derived from relations and that one might therefore 
throw out altogether the concept of pure and simple sensations which plays such a large role in Mach. (Quoted 
in Caldwell, 2004, 242) 
Hayek’s argument is neither novel nor original. In fact, Mach himself responds to similar criticisms 
in the fifth edition of The Analysis of Sensations: ‘For me the elements A B C ... are immediately and 
indubitably given, and for me they can never afterwards be volatilized away by considerations which 
ultimately are always based on their existence’ (Mach, 1914, 45). 
 In my view, the argument that the concept of elements is meaningless because it is the 
relations between the elements that count is meaningless in its own right. This claim is based on the 
misunderstanding of the role of said elements in Mach’s theoretical system. The notion of the 
homogenous elements as constituents of all things, much like the impersonal method of science, is a 
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theoretical device through which Mach seeks to overcome the dichotomy of mind and body, 
subjectivism and objectivism, idealism and materialism, ontology and epistemology (Baç, 2000). It 
would be a completely different exercise to assess whether this task was or could be at all 
accomplished. Mach himself refers to the elements as ‘fictions’. He calls them ‘tentative’ and 
‘preliminary’ and compares them to the elements of chemistry (Mach, 1976[2005]). Statements, such 
as ‘[f]or us, colors, sounds, spaces, times, . . . are provisionally the ultimate elements, whose given 
connexion it is our business to investigate’ (Mach, 1914, 29-30, emphasis added), seem to suggest 
that Mach wishes to avoid the display of any dogmatic certainty about the fundamental nature of the 
world (Cohen, 1968). This brings us to our next question as to whether he rejects the existence of an 
objective world different from the one we could get to know through our senses. 
 As an empiricist and phenomenologist, although highly unconventional one, Mach asserts 
that our interaction with physical objects produces ‘effects we call sensations’. This is how we 
acquire information about these objects which is then converted into ‘mental symbols’. The only 
way for us to get to know the world is through our own sensations. To hypothesize about any 
properties of objects that cannot be established through sensations is a meaningless task (Mach, 
1914, 12).  
A thing that is beyond the ken of knowledge, a thing that cannot be exhibited to the senses, has no meaning in 
natural science. I have not the remotest desire of setting limits to the imagination of men, but I have a faint 
suspicion that the persons who imagine they have conceptions of ‘absolute motions’, in the majority of cases have 
in mind the memory pictures of some actually experienced relative motion; (Mach, 1919, 568) 
Should this be taken to imply that Mach rejects the existence of ‘an objective world...’? Perhaps. 
What we can state with certainty is that he rejects the existence of the world as an ‘unknowable 
entity’ on the ground that ‘the ego is not a monad isolated from the world but part of it’ (Mach, 
1976[1905], 361).  
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According to Hayek’s final criticism, phenomenalists and positivists construe the task of 
science as merely describing the phenomenal world.  Their basic thesis that ‘all phenomena are 
subject to invariable laws’ cannot possibly be true ‘if the term phenomenon is taken in its strict 
meaning of things as they appear to us’ (Hayek, 1952, 173). In what follows, I argue that this 
criticism is not relevant to Mach’s case for two main reasons. First, there are no invariable laws in 
Mach’s world; in fact, there is nothing invariable in that world. Second, Mach’s notion of 
‘description’ is not the same as the literal one and the purpose of science is not exhausted by 
providing descriptions of phenomena. 
Mach is a phenomenologist of a special kind who could not be labeled as positivist in any 
justifiable way. His philosophy and theory of science are nondeterministic in the widest sense of the 
word: ‘The universe is like a machine in which the motion of certain parts is determined by that of 
others, only nothing is determined about the motion of the whole machine (Mach, 1911, 69). People 
acquire knowledge of the world not only by relying on their senses but with the help of intuition and 
intuitive knowledge which play an essential role in scientific enterprise: ‘Intuition is organically older 
and more strongly based than conceptual thought… It is from intuition that the first clear ideas, 
concepts and reflections develop’ (Mach 1976[1905], 109).  ‘An instinctive, irreflective knowledge’ 
always precedes the scientific investigation of phenomena (Mach, 1919, 1). The purpose of scientific 
inquiry is to study the connexions between elements, the functional interdependence of phenomena. 
Concepts, theories, and laws are not set in stone; they are means of provisional knowledge or 
orientation, useful as long as they serve their purpose: ‘theories are like dry leaves which fall away 
when they have long ceased to be the lungs of the tree of science’ (Mach, 1911, 74). 
Mach never commits himself exclusively to deduction or induction as the ‘right’ method of 
scientific inquiry but emphasizes the usefulness of both. 
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As a natural inquirer, I am accustomed to begin with some special and definite inquiry, and allow the same to 
act upon me in all its phases, and to ascend from the special aspects to more general points of view. I followed 
this custom also in the investigation of the development of physical knowledge. I was obliged to proceed in this 
manner for the reason that a theory of theory was too difficult a task for me, being doubly difficult in a province 
in which a minimum of indisputable, general, and independent truths from which everything can be deduced is 
not furnished at the start, but must first be sought for. (Mach, 1919, 581) 
 
…it is rather strange that most enquirers … denote induction as the principal means of enquiry, as though the 
natural sciences had nothing to do but directly classify individual facts that lie openly about. Not that we wish to 
deny that to be important too, but it does not exhaust the enquirer’s task: he must above all find the relevant 
characteristics and their connections, which is much harder than classifying what is known already. The name 
‘inductive sciences’ for the natural sciences is therefore not justified. (Mach, 1976[1905], 231) 
Mach indeed states that scientific explanations are descriptions for the purpose of ‘economy’; that is, 
they are descriptions of countless individual facts presented in a short form. This does not exhaust 
the purpose of science or of the scientist. What sets apart the gifted scientists with a broad view 
from the naïve observers with a narrow view is that the former can use their intuition to ‘clearly 
perceive principles through all the facts’, ‘recognizing a principle directly as the key for 
understanding all facts in a domain and seeing in their minds how it penetrates all facts’ while the 
latter are detracted by ‘secondary circumstances’ and ‘find it difficult to select and pay attention to 
what is essential. Productive scientists do not simply enumerate facts and arrange them in lists but 
either ‘reconstruct’ them or build ‘ideal cases’ from their ‘own reservoir of ideas’ (Feierabend, 1984, 
6-7).  
Mach’s notion of scientific ‘description’ is thus quite specific: it is based not on the 
assumption that all phenomena are subject to invariable laws but on the presupposition of the 
functional interdependence of the elements. ‘Description is a building up of facts in thought, and 
this building up is, in the experimental sciences, often the condition of actual execution… Science 
completes in thought facts that are only partly given’ (Mach, 1895, 253). Mach’s definition of the purpose of 
science as the adaptation of thoughts to facts does not entail a mechanical repetition of the unaltered 
facts through the medium of thought but is rather ‘a dialectical process that transforms both 
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ingredients’ (Feierabend, 1984, 8-9). Ideas are different from sensations and concepts are different 
from facts: ‘the factual elements contained in concepts must not mislead us into identifying these 
mental formations, always requiring correction, with the facts themselves’ (Mach, 1976 [1905], 99). 
Ultimately, there can never be a one-to-one correspondence between facts and thoughts. The 
specter that haunted Hayek was never there. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that key aspects of Hayek’s theory of mind are not only ‘suggested’ by the 
‘psychological views’ of Ernst Mach but build directly upon them. The similarities between the two 
thinkers extend beyond psychology to include aspects of ontology and epistemology. It is further 
argued that some of the criticisms Hayek leveled against Mach concern nonessential points, are due 
to the uncritical acceptance of common misinterpretations of Mach’s theory, or are plainly wrong. 
The view taken here is that Hayek never became fully aware of how significant the influence of 
Mach’s ideas on his own truly was. 
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1 Mach’s Analysis of Sensations was first published in German in 1886 and translated into English the year after. 
All references in this paper are from the 5th English edition of 1914. All emphasis is in the original if not 
stated otherwise. 
